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THE HANDICAPPED CHILD'S RIGHT TO AN
EFFECTIVE MINIMAL EDUCATION
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are many ways in which handicapped children are denied
an effective public education: some are denied admission to the public
school system; some, although admitted, are denied the special help
they need; some have been misplaced and, although receiving special
help, are denied the particular program that they require.' It is the
thesis of this article that each handicapped child is entitled to an
effective minimal education, as distinguished from mere custody.
"Education," for purposes of this article, is broadly defined as that
process that helps persons to "cope and function within their environ-
ment. ' 2 "Minimal," as a legal standard, is used to denote that quant-
ity of education necessary to a meaningful exercise of first amend-
ment rights and of the right to vote.' Finally, education is "effective"
if it results in measurable improvement. In other words, at any point
in the educational process, a person will be measurably better able
to cope and function within his environment than he was at any
previous point, the points being separated by a reasonable time pe-
riod.4
The article begins with an examination of the current situation
in terms of both the numbers and the attitudes of persons involved
in the education of the handicapped. While the article is primarily
concerned with the mentally retarded, much of what applies to the
retarded applies as well to other handicapped children. A preliminary
view will be taken of the methods available to lawyers for securing
education for the handicapped, with an analysis of the due process
and equal protection arguments forming the substantive bases of
those methods. It is concluded that procedural safeguards are insuffi-
cient to guarantee the substantive right of the handicapped child to
* Member of the Ohio Bar.
Wald, The Right to Education, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 833
(B. Ennis and P. Friedman eds. 1973).
2 See Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children. A
Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1046 (1972). See also infra, Section III.
San Antonio Independent School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 36 (1973). See also infra,
Section HII.
See infra, Section V.
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make educational progress. While procedural rights will guarantee
custody of the child, only substantive rights, it is submitted, will
guarantee the education of that child. Finally, it is concluded that the
determination and supervision of this substantive right is not beyond
judicial competence.
II. EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED TODAY
A. The Dimensions of the Situation
Twenty-four million people in the United States have mental,
physical or behavioral impairments sufficiently disabling to require
special education.5 Seven million of these persons are children, and
six million of these children are of school age.6 These latter children
represent over ten percent of all school-aged children in the United
States today.7 Of these six million children, one million are totally
excluded from any form of education.' Slightly more than three and
one-half million receive no special education, and of the nearly one
and one-half million who do receive special education, only one half
are taught by teachers certified in that field? Thus, we are currently
5 See Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (1972). It is important here to note the variety
of conditions suffered by these people and to realize especially the differences among even those
suffering from the same condition. Categories include:
(a) The mentally retarded. Like all the others, this group is heterogeneous, ranging from
the midly to the profoundly retarded.
(b) The emotionally disturbed, including such diverse groups as the hyperactive and the
psychotic.
(c) Persons with medical problems ranging from the lack of vaccination to epilepsy.
(d) Crippled children.
(e) Blind, deaf and mute children.
(f) Linguistic minorities.
(g) "Bad children," i.e., discipline problems.
6 Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 2, at 1038. Whether or not there is an affirmative duty
to educate handicapped adults is an important question beyond the scope of this article. An
important factor in determining the rights of handicapped adults would appear to be the age
of the person at the time the condition arose. Thus the question becomes whether or not age is
a rational basis for different treatment of handicapped adults and handicapped children. The
consent decree in Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), raised this question but left it unresolved. But
Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973), by consent decree, stated that mentally
retarded adults who were without education as children must be placed in programs appropriate
to their age.
7 S. KIRK, EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 24 (1962).
8 Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 2, at 1038.
1 Address by E. Martin, "The Right to Learn," 8th Annual International Conference of
the Association for Children with Learning Disabilities, Chicago, Illinois, March, 1971. Six
million of the twenty-four million handicapped persons are retarded. Of these six million, five
million have never received any services developed specifically to meet their needs. Herr, supra
note 5, at 996.
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providing to only ten percent of these children the special services that
they require.
B. The Attitudes of the States and of the Schools
Every state has constitutional provisions for public education
and compulsory school attendance laws. Yet certain children may be
excluded:
.. . The superintendent of schools of the district in which the child
resides may excuse him from attendance for any part of the remain-
der of the current school year upon satisfactory showing of either
of the following facts: (1) that his bodily or mental condition does
not permit his attendance at school during such period .... 1
Laws such as this very often result in compulsory non-attendance for
the handicapped child, and neither the handicapped child nor his
parent has a statutory right to demand his placement in the regular
classroom. Indeed, prior to 1969, a demand for placement was a
misdemeanor in North Carolina.1
The rationale for the denial of educational services to these chil-
dren is very often expressed in terms such as the following:
• . .[T]he handicapped cannot learn, their presence in school will
negatively affect the learning of the normal children, these children
make non-handicapped children and adults uncomfortable, the cost
of their education is too great, and the teachers and facilities are in
short supply.'2
If a school views a particular child as a problem, it may respond
with exclusion or suspension of the child, transfer or inappropriate
placement. Further, action may be taken without proper evaluation,
notice to parents or due process protections. Handicapped children
are sometimes denied effective education through more subtle meth-
ods, however. They may be placed on a waiting list for special educa-
tion classes and then suspended until one of the few places in the
special education program becomes available-perhaps months or
years later. Or they may wait for a tuition grant that is not currently
funded. 3
An advocate should not become complacent merely because he
finds himself in one of the approximately thirty-five states with either
, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Page 1972).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-65 (1966) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-65 (Supp. 1974).
2 Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 2, at 1057-58.
n MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, BASIC RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY, HANDICAPPED 41
(1973) [hereinafter cited MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT].
36 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 349 (1975)
a statute or a court decision mandating educational programs for the
handicapped. 14 Massachusetts, for example, has a law entitling handi-
capped children to participate in special education programs. 5 Yet,
in 1972, an observer stated that
Boston is a flagrant violation of the Massachusetts State Law in its
virtual exclusion of the handicapped children from the public school
system ...
In general, crippled children in Boston are not allowed to at-
tend school. And, except for isolated instances, they are prevented
from attending school altogether. No one seems to know what hap-
pens to crippled children in Boston. No person, no agency knows
how many crippled children there are, where they are, or what
happens to them once they are rejected from the Boston School
system. Not only does Boston exclude handicapped children from
the public schools, but also does not follow up on the placement or
nonplacement of the children ....
C. Parental Attitudes
Most parents are, of course, concerned about the education of
their children.1 7 Yet parents do not always advocate what is in the
best interests of their children. Parental attitudes have other dimen-
sions, sometimes resulting in a potential conflict of interest between
the parent and the child. The mental, physical and economic stresses
of caring for a handicapped child, as well as the interests of other
children in the family, may result not only in a denial of education
to the child, but, perhaps, in institutionalization, when such action is
not in the best interests of the child.18
Yet another facet of the situation is
.. . the inability of many well-intentioned parents to deal effec-
tively with the public and private institutional providers of service.
For example, the parent of a child in a special education class within
the public school system is likely to hesitate to question the quality
of the program since the threat of exclusion weighs heavily in the
parents' minds. The parent is realistically aware that the cost of a
private program is prohibitive and that the public program is better
than that which the parent could provide at home. Similarly, a
parent of a child who has been voluntarily admitted to a state
" See id. at 54.
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 71B, § 2 (Supp. 1972).
" MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 13, at 44.
,7 See, e.g., Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 2, at 1042-44.
's Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 133, 139-40 (1972).
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institution would hestitate to challenge the quality of the care pro-
vided because the child is constantly subject to the threat of sub-
tle-and not so subtle-retaliation. I'
Thus the attorney must determine who his client is: parent or child.
III. CURRENT ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
The consent decree in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania,"0 [hereinafter referred to as P.A.R.C.],
stated that all mentally retarded children would benefit from educa-
tion,2 and the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education22 said that
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor-
tunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.2Y
In securing the rights of his client, the advocate must be aware
of the extent of those rights, as well as of the manner in which courts
have approached both education and equal educational opportunity.
A. Education
Courts have tended to deal with education in very broad terms.
Wyatt v. Stickneyl defined education as the "process of formal train-
ing and instruction to facilitate the intellectual and emotional devel-
opment of [the mentally retarded]."' The Wyatt definition, however,
must be read in light of its definition of "habilitation," to which, the
court held, the mentally retarded residents of state institutions had a
right:
" Id. at 143.
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
21 Id. See also M. Burgdorf, The Right to Appropriate Free Public Education for
Mentally Retarded Citizens in LEGAL PLANNING AND LEGAL RIGHTS FOR MENTALLY RE-
TARDED AND DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED OHIOANS (1973):
The learning curve is the same for the retarded child as is for the normal child. That
is, although they might start at a much lower level of learning skills, they increase
in their abilities. They still learn and retain material. The tests indicate that children
can benefit from an education regardless of the degree of their handicapping condi-
tion.
" 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
24 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
21 Id. at 395.
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[Habilitation is] the process by which the staff of the institution
assists the resident to acquire and maintain those life skills which
enable him to cope more effectively with the demands of his own
person and his environment and to raise the level of his physical,
mental, and social efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited
to programs of formal, structured education and treatment.26
Expert witnesses in P.A.R.C.2 were slightly more specific when
they testified that
[e]ducation cannot be defined solely as the provision of academic
experiences to children. Rather, education must be seen as a contin-
uous process by which individuals learn to cope and function within
their environment. Thus, for children to learn to clothe and feed
themselves is a legitimate outcome achievable through an educa-
tional program.21
The United States Supreme Court, too, endorsed a broad defini-
tion of education by stating in dictum ". . . that the value of all
education must be assessed in terms of its capacity to prepare the
child for life." '29
It may be contended, however, that the Court has since nar-
rowed its definition of education to that "quantum of education...
[that is a] prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right (the
right to vote and to receive First Amendment freedoms) ... .
Yet such a definition does not narrow the breadth of the definition
of education; it may merely place an .upper limit upon the
constitutionally guaranteed right to education. It indicates that the
constitutional right to education is a right to a certain minimum
education as opposed to a right to an unlimited education.
B. Equal Educational Opportunity
If the concept of education is broad, it follows, then, that the
concept of equal educational opportunity is similarly broad. Yet
equal educational opportunity must not be confused with identical
education opportunity.3' Since the benefit to be derived from a par-
ticular program depends upon the particular child involved, identical
Id. (emphasis supplied).
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 2, at 1046.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972). But ef., Case v. California, Civil No.
101679 (Super.Ct. Riverside Cy., Calif., filed Jan. 7, 1972), where the judge ruled that teaching
a school-aged child to eat, wash, dress, etc., is not educating the child within the meaning of
the state's education code.
31 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
3' See generally 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 146 (1969).
HANDICAPPED CHILD'S RIGHT
treatment of the handicapped child and the "average" child would,
in terms of results, be unequal treatment:
[M]any judicial decisions still define equality on a "sameness" doc-
trine, equal resources to "children whose needs are unequal." Such
a philosophy may have been appropriate for a society that was
based on family economic production that could absorb those who
could not compete equally in the nation's economic system. Today,
however, the education of a child is a community concern, for if he
is not given skills sufficient for economic participation then he will
become dependent upon the community."
Yet a concept of equality of educational opportunity measured in
terms of abolute equality of educational objectives is likewise unreal-
istic, for "it assumes that all children have innate capabilities for
common educational attainments." It is submitted that equal edu-
cational opportunity, as a constitutional standard, should be defined
to include both equal access to appropriate services and to equal
minimal results. If this "minimal" education is seen as that minimum
amount necessary to the meaningful exercise of first amendment
rights, then the goal could be set at, for example, an exercise at a
sixth-grade level. It must be remembered, however, that one's right
is not the right to the "meaningful exercise of first amendment
rights" actualized, but, rather, one's right is the right to approach
such an exercise, i.e., the right to get as far as one is able toward the
minimum.
Yet if equality is measured in these terms, rather than in terms
of equal financial expenditures, then it cannot be denied that addi-
tional services and programs will very likely be required for handi-
capped children.34 For example
. . . most states do not accept children into the public school system
until age five or six. Yet by the time retarded children reach this
age, they are already behind normal children in terms of learning
3 Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 2, at 1055 (footnotes omitted).
3 Id. While a handicapped adult's right to education is beyond the scope of this article,
it could be argued that equal educational opportunity really means both equal access to educa-
tional services and equal results. This argument would be based upon education as a fundamen-
tal first amendment right necessary to-the exercise of other first amendment rights, as is the
right of association. See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). Lau involved Chinese-
speaking children who had the capacity for equal results but were not provided with the means
to achieve them.
31 But see Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972), where the court held that New
York City had fulfilled its constitutional obligation by providing equal services to maintain a
park in a mixed black and Puerto Rican neighborhood, even though conditions beyond the
control of the city prevented results equal to those in other neighborhoods.
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ability. Whereas normal children have been able to develop at home
the basic tools necessary for formal school education, the families
of the retarded usually cannot provide the more specialized teaching
in the home that their children require in order to develop those
same tools."
IV. METHODS AND RATIONALES CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO
OBTAIN EDUCATIONAL SERVICES FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
A. Those Not Involving Litigation
A lawyer seeking to obtain educational services for his handi-
capped client need not always resort to litigation. He can, of course,
negotiate, approaching local or state school officials to request con-
sideration of an individual case or general reform. Political support
should be amassed if that would support the negotiations. A lawyer
can request an opinion of the state's attorney general, if the lawyer
feels that a favorable opinion would result. The attorney general of
New Mexico in 1971, for example, was the moving force behind the
recognition of a right to education for the handicapped children in
that state." He can lobby for legislation. Of the 899 bills dealing with
the education of the handicapped introduced in state legislatures in
1971, 237 were enacted. 7 A model law for the education of the
handicapped has been developed and proposed by the Council for
Exceptional Children. Some legislators may be further persuaded by
the fact that several international agreements recognize a right to
educationA
B. Litigation
Of course, a lawyer may be forced to litigate. Suits based upon
23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1141, 1163 (1972). If it is assumed that education is a fundamen-
tal first amendment right, and if Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) is perceived as
holding that parents may keep their children from school when they can provide the child's
education, then it may be argued that where parents are expected to educate their children (i.e.,
pre-school) but cannot, due to the child's handicap, the state must provide that education. This
argument is weak where the child can make up lost time when he reaches school, but it gains
strength where the delay causes permanent damage.
M MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 13, at 48-49.
Id. at 49.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71
(1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
done Nov. 4, 1950, 155-57 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 4; see American Convention
on Human Rights, done Nov. 29, 1967, O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser .K/XVI/I.I; 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 99 (1970); Charter of the Organization of American States, done April 30,
1948, 151 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 2361 ,119 U.N.T.S. 3.
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state regulations or statutes,39 or upon a state constitution" have met
with some success." There have been two landmark cases, each based
at least in part on the United States Constitution, dealing with the
issue of a child's right to education. P.A.R.C.4 2 required by consent
decree that the state provide all mentally retarded children access to
a free public education appropriate to their learning capacities. The
district court in Mills v. Board of Education43 held that all handi-
capped children (not just the retarded) have a right to an individually
appropriate education.
After recognizing that all mentally retarded persons are capable
of benefiting from a program of education and training, the parties
in P.A.R.C. agreed upon the posture to be adopted by Pennsylvania
toward its mentally retarded children.
It is the Commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally
retarded child in a free, public program of education and training
appropriate to the child's capacity, within the context of a presump-
tion that, among the alternative programs of education and training
required by statute to be available, placement in a regular public
school class is preferable to placement in a special public school
class and placement in a special public school class is preferable to
placement in any other type of program of education and training.4
The consent decree of P.A.R.C. may be read as resting upon two
theoretical foundations.45 The first was a due process construct re-
- Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) is at least partially grounded
upon statute.
0 In Wolf v. Legislature of the State of Utah, C.A. No. 182646 (Third Dist. Ct., Salt Lake
Cy., 1969), involving the denial of state educational services to retarded children, the court held
that the state constitution and laws guarantee to every child an educational opportunity within
the public school system.
41 While most such suits seek injunctive relief, there are cases currently pending in Louis-
iana and in California seeking monetary damages. Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D.
La. 1972); Corarrubias v. San Diego Unified School Dist., No. 70-394-T (filed S.D. Cal., Feb.,
1971). (The latter action was based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1871.) A Connecticut court
awarded $13,000 in back tuition costs to the parents of a handicapped child who obtained
private education for their child when the public school failed to provide an appropriate pro-
gram. Kivell v. Nemortan, No. 143913 (Super. Ct., Fairfield Cy., Conn., July 18, 1974).
Finally, an award of attorney's fees may be available as well. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd on other grounds sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
'= 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
" 334 F. Supp. at 1260 (emphasis supplied).
, It is unclear whether the order in P.A.R.C. found its basis upon the United States
Constitution or upon interpretations of state statutes and regulations. An indication that it was
upon the former may be seen in a related decision where the court specifidally held that, while
state law was involved, it did have federal question jurisdiction. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Re-
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quiring that no child alleged to be mentally retarded could be acted
upon in such a manner as to either change his educational status or
to totally exclude him from public education without first affording
him notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The second focused
upon equal protection, and the decree prohibited the state from deny-
ing any mentally retarded person between the ages of six and twenty-
one access to free public education. Further, periodic re-evaluation
was to be given every child placed on homebound instruction and, if
appropriate, reinstatement into the public classroom was to result.
In a contested case, the Mills court made reference to District
of Columbia statutes as well as to the United States Constitution.46
Judge Waddy stated that the fact that all parents face criminal penal-
ties for failure to send their children to school presupposes that an
educational opportunity will be made available to those children. In
addition to holding that handicapped children cannot be excluded
from an appropriate education, the court held as well that due process
requires that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before
a child is excluded from or classified into any particular program.
Thus suits based upon the Constitution of the United States have
focused upon two basic legal theories to attack the exclusion of handi-
capped children from equal educational opportunities and the place-
ment of children in inappropriate classes: (1) due process is denied
the child when the state unfairly stigmatizes him or unfairly denies
him public benefits and (2) the equal protection of the law is denied
that child excluded from public education when the state makes edu-
cational opportunity freely available to other children.
1. Due process
The concept of due process is an attempt to guarantee that the
government will act fairly towards its citizens, 7 and procedural due
process provides such safeguards as the rights to adequate notice and
to the opportunity for a fair hearing prior to governmental disturb-
ance of an individual's essential interests."
tarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Of course, a determi-
nation that a federal question exists for jurisdictional purposes is not equivalent to a determina-
tion on the merits, and so the status of the decision remains unclear.
40 As in P.A.R.C., it is not clear whether the Mills decision has a constitutional basis. The
court granted relief despite the fact that Congress failed to appropriate funds sufficient to
effectuate its statutory program. Since such failure is usually interpreted to bear upon the true
intent of the legislature in enacting its program, it has been argued that the basis of the decision
was not solely statutory. 52 BosToN U.L. REv. 884, 887 (1972).
11 Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student
Classifications, 12 U.PA. L.REv. 705, 775 (1973).
11 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1141, 1154 (1972).
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That public education is one of the essential interests requiring
notice and hearing prior to total deprivation is well established.49 Yet,
in the area of education for the handicapped child, the threat of total
deprivation from public education is not the only governmental ac-
tion requiring the safeguards of procedural due process. Even classifi-
cation by the state of a child as retarded, uneducable or emotionally
disturbed is of such a nature and has such severe ramfications that
procedural due process is applicable to such governmental action.
The United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Constantineau0
held that notice and opportunity to be heard is required when a label
or characterization given a person, though a mark of serious illness
to some, is to others a stigma or badge of disgrace.51 Classification
as retarded or as uneducable is as great a "badge of disgrace" as
being labeled an alcoholic.
While procedural due process is applicable to governmental ac-
tion when a person's essential interests are at stake, the particular
procedures required depend upon the context and the balance of
interests involved.
In view of the type of issues to be decided, considerable assis-
tance to the student, an impartial and informed tribunal, and con-
tinuing review of the program as well as child are essential if the
school classification process is to be made fundamentally fair. The
minimally fair procedures for school classifications, therefore, must
be closely tailored to the primary interest in adequate education of
both the school and the student if the child is to be safeguarded from
arbitrary abuse. These procedures must accommodate the continu-
ing nature of the personal and school interests at stake. 2
"1 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); see generally Dimond, The Constitutional Right
to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1112-13 (1973).
400 U.S. 433 (1971).
51 400 U.S. at 436. In that case, a state statute provided for notice to be posted in all retail
liquor outlets that sales or gifts of liquor were forbidden to any person who by excessive
drinking produces certain conditions, such as exposing himself or family "to want" or becoming
"dangerous to the peace" of the community. Because the statute authorized posting without
notice or hearing, it was held unconstitutional as violative of procedural due process.
52 Dimond, supra note 49, at 1115. See also Kirp, supra note 47, at 780-87. In Marlega v.
Board of School Directors, Civil Action No. 70-C-8 (E.D. Wis., Sept. 17, 1970), the plaintiff
sued for a restraining order preventing the school board from excluding him from school for
"medical reasons" (hyper-activity) without first providing him a fair hearing. The case ended
with a consent decree which established a procedure to be followed in exempting a child from
the public school. A conference with the child's parents must be held and the parents, if they
disagree with the school's decision have the right to a hearing at which they may be represented
by counsel, may call their own witnesses and may cross-examine witnesses called by the school.
The recommendation to the school board must be based upon the evidence presented at the
hearing. Marlega thus attempts to insure that handicapped children in Wisconsin will be
accorded the same procedural rights that "normal" children receive when threatened with
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A further source of procedural protection may be found in the
placement concept known as the Cascade System,5 3 which controls
the placement of a child in need of special educational services. The
services available are listed in order of increasing restrictiveness:
1. Regular Classroom
A. Regular classroom with specialist consultation
B. Regular classroom with itinerent teachers
C. Regular classroom plus a resource room
2. Part-Time Special Class
3. Full-Time Special Class
4. Special Day School
5. Residential School
6. Hospital
The child is moved down the cascade only as far as necessary, and
should be moved back up the cascade as soon as possible. No place-
ment decision is ever final within the system, for it is impossible to
predict the learning (including behavioral learning) capacity of any
child.54
Thus, procedural safeguards play a role at two stages of the
cascade:55 in determining when a move down the cascade is necessary,
and in determining when a child should be moved back up. A single
hearing prior to placing a child in a special class does not alone
constitute due process. Rather, there must be periodic re-evaluation
and hearings to assure the continued necessity for placement outside
the regular classroom situation. The later decisions of P.A.R. C .5 and
Wyatt l7 recognized the vital role of re-evaluation when they required
exclusion from public schools. It is possible, however, that in dealing with the child through
his parents, actual due process will not be accorded the handicapped child in all cases because
of the possible conflict of interests between the parents and their child.
0 Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 2, at 1040. See MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT,
supra note 13, at 53-54. See also Reynolds, A Framework for Considering Some Issues in
Special Education, 28 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 367-70 (1962).
" MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 13, at 53-54.
m San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) may present a
barrier to court involvement in educational decisions. However, Rodriguez contained complex
and delicate questions of fiscal planning, federalism, local taxation as well as educational
policy-Le., the correlation between additional expenditures and educational quality. See
Comment, Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the Mentally Retarded, 34
OHIO ST. L.J. 554, 567 (1973) [hereinafter cited Comment]. Further, court involvement in the
Cascade System would be limited to procedural requirements provided for by the system itself.
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
57 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
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that periodic inquiries into the needs of the persons being classified
and periodic review of those classifications be made."
2. Equal protection
Equal protection is the second basic legal theory used to chal-
lenge both the exclusion of handicapped children from equal educa-
(5th Cir. 1974). This case involved the rights of patients instutionalized through civil
commitment procedures.
I A major vehicle of education for the mentally retarded is compensatory education-i.e.,
programs resulting from downward moves on the cascade to help handicapped children to
achieve educational progress. Because assignment to compensatory educational programs with
lengthy waiting lists has been used to exclude handicapped children from all education, compen-
satory programs have become a major issue within the field of education generally. To be sure,
there are cases standing for the proposition that deprivation of constitutional rights calls for
prompt rectification. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334
F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974). Yet in 1971, Massachusetts had 1,371 children on waiting lists, seventy-eight percent of
whom had been waiting for more than two years for actual placement either in residential or
day schools. L. BURRELLO, H. DEYOUNG AND D. LANG, TESTING, LABELING AND PLACEMENT:
SPECIAL EDUCATION AND LITIGATION 9 (unpublished).
Even Rodriguez may provide support to recognition of a substantive right to compensatory
education when the regular classroom cannot provide a minimally-required education. The
issue of efficacy of these programs is important, however. Presently, there is no general agree-
ment whether such programs are indeed effective and studies can be found to support either
conclusion. See Note, 42 S. CAL. L.REv. 146, 162-63 (1969). If a special education class does
not provide a child with a better education than would a regular classroom then both the stigma
of special education placement and the Cascade System would require placement in the regular
classroom.
On the other hand, ability grouping and compensatory education may be a threat to equal
protection. Hobson v. Hanson, 369 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), held that the tract system in
the Washington, D. C. public schools discriminated against disadvantaged children in general
and especially against black children. Although the court assumed that tracking could be
rationally related to the purposes of public education, if based upon tests accurately measuring
ability, classification in that case was irrational because the cultural bias of the tests used could
provide no such measurement.
Most school systems use learning ability, as measured by standardized intelligence tests,
to group children and such grouping usually results in three categories: (1) students possessing
the skills measured by the tests and who therefore are to remain in the regular classroom; (2)
students not possessing those skills and who cannot, at least over a relatively short period of
time, develop them. These are the mentally retarded who can and should be placed in special
classes where they can develop to their maximum potential; (3) students not possessing those
skills because of a cultural or economic deprivation, but who are capable of acquiring them
within a short period of time. These children are-but should not be-placed in special classes
where they cannot achieve their full potential. L. BURELLO, et al., at 16. Even individual
intelligence tests are often too insensitive in their administration to reflect real need. See, e.g.,
E. Hall, The Politics of Special Education, Nos. 3&4 in INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 18-19
(1970). See also Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Diana v. State Bd. of
Educ., C-70 37 RFR (N.D. Cal. 1970) (misclassification as mentally retarded of Mexican-
American children because not tested in their primary language).
In sum, it would appear that compensatory programs should be used, as indicated by the
Cascade System, when necessary. It is for this reason that due process requirements like those
in P.A.R.C., Mills and Wyatt are crucial.
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tional opportunities and the inappropriate placement of children in
special education classes. The Supreme Court has consistently recog-
nized that the fourteenth amendment does not absolutely prohibit
differing treatment by the state of different groups of people.59 State
classifications which are suspect or which affect a fundamental inter-
est are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny and are upheld only if
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. On the other hand,
classifications neither suspect nor affecting a fundamental interest
have traditionally been upheld if rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective and if not arbitrary." In order to determine,
then, which standard is to be applied, it is necessary to first determine
the status of education, and of handicapped children as a classifica-
tion. 1
a. A minimum education as a fundamental right. Superficially,
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez"2 appears
to hold that education is not a fundamental right. Rodriguez involved
an attack upon the constitutionality of a method of school financing
that resulted in differences in the per-pupil expenditures among the
various school districts. It was not alleged, however, that any student
received less than an adequate education. In rejecting the attack, the
Court held that, when all students receive an adequate education,
differences in the amount spent upon each child must meet the stan-
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
60 See generally Comment, supra note 55.
61 Recent Supreme Court opinions indicate a more flexible approach to equal protection
than the traditional two-tiered approach discussed above. See generally, Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term: Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1(1972). The Court seems to be looking more
closely at the reasonableness of the challenged classification. "[T]he yardstick for the accepta-
bility of the means would be the purposes chosen by the legislatures, not 'constitutional' interest
drawn from the value perceptions of the Justices." Id. at 21. Under this standard, also known
as the "means-focused" equal protection test, not only must the means be directed toward a
legitimate end, but where there are alternatives, those means themselves must not violate the
equal protection clause. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 405 U.S. 71 (1971), where the Court struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause an Idaho law giving mandatory preference to
men in the administration of decedents' estates, although the Court recognized that the purpose
of the statute "is Aot without some legitimacy." 404 U.S. at 76. See Comment, supra note 55,
at 561-69.
If Rodriguez seems to revert to the two-tiered equal protection analysis, it may be the
exception proving the rule. "The major limitation on the exercise of that scrutiny of the means-
focused equal protection test would stem from particular considerations ofjudicial competence,
not from broad a priori categorization of the 'social and economic' variety." Gunther, supra
note 86, at 23. Since Rodriguez contained complex issues of federalism, local taxation and
educational policy, the Court may have been influenced to use the traditional rational basis
test. None of these factors are present in cases dealing with the total denial of effective educa-
tion.
62 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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dard of only rational relation to a legitimate state interest. If
Rodriguez is perceived as holding that education beyond some
minimum adequate level is not a fundamental right, its holding would
be inapplicable to a challenge to a total denial of education or to a
denial of an adequate education. 3
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State financing
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities
to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding
an interference with fundamental rights where only relative dif-
ferneces in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system fails
to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic mini-
mal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and
of full participation in the political process."
The denial of an adquate education of a retarded child is a denial
of the opportunity to acquire the basic skills of citizenship, and may
result in the loss of individual liberties:
Education always has been an aspect of, and in tension with,
the First Amendment freedoms. It is in large part an intellectual
and political activity whose impact affects the exercise of all other
rights; it is for this reason that education is vital to the maintenance
of democratic institutions and has long been the subject of special
judicial protection. That education is political, a method of passing
our culture and "way of life" from one generation to the next, is
obvious; indeed, it is this very political aspect of schooling with its
compulsory overtones which has so often been in tension with the
rights to know, express, and freely exercise religious belief ....
In the case of exclusion from educational opportunity, we deal with
a system of public education which does deny to some children all
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary to citizen-
ship, and even freedom from later state institutionalization: there-
fore we deal with state regulation directly affecting freedoms guar-
anteed by the Constitution. 5
" Rodriguez may also be distinguished from cases in which the issue is equal protection
for the retarded, since the case involved other, more delicate, issues. See Comment, supra note
55.
" 411 U.S. at 36-37. Similarly, the Court failed to deal with the total deprivation of
education in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where it held that Amish parents could
not be convicted for violating Wisconsin's school law when they refused to send their children
to school after the eighth grade. The Court balanced the state's interest in education against
the citizen's right to freely exercise his religion, and was careful to restrict its opinion to the
years after the eighth grade. The real issue as perceived by the Court was not the difference
between education and no education, but rather the difference between education by the state
and education by the Amish community.
1 Dimond, supra note 49, at 1104-05.
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Thus, like the right of association, the right to an effective minimal
education may be viewed as a "right cognate to those of free speech
and free press and is equally fundamental." 6 Furthermore, since they
are less likely than ordinary children to learn and to develop infor-
mally, the consequences of inadequate formal education is even more
severe for handicapped children.67
b. Classification of the handicapped as suspect." The Supreme
Court has enunciated three indicia of "suspectness" that will compel
a court to apply the strict standard of scrutiny to governmental classi-
fication. The first rationale for according the extraordinary protec-
tion of the strict standard was aimed at those groups who have no
access to the political process. 9 Mentally retarded children as a group
are precluded from the political process and have been neglected by
state legislatures. The handicapped may therefore be accorded the
protection appropriate to a suspect class. It is possible, however, that
with the increased political activity of parents' groups and of others
concerned with the treatment of the mentally retarded, courts may
in the future hold that legislatures adequately consider the interests
of the mentally retarded and may therefore deny to the class the
special protection accorded to suspect classes. A second rationale for
the application of the strict standard of scrutiny is found in a legally
sanctioned classification that stigmatized members of the class. 0 This
special protection of the strict standard is clearly applicable to use
by school authorities of labels that brand the handicapped child with
the stigma of uneducability and proclaim that he is unfit for educa-
tional opportunity. Finally, the Court has indicated that it is willing
to strictly scrutinize classes that are congenital, essentially immuta-
ble, and over the existence of which its members have no control.7
" DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
11 Memorandum in Support of Verified Complaint in Mills v. Board of Education of the
District of Columbia, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, supra note 1, at 903.
69 This issue has been dealt with extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., Comment, supra note
55. Consequently, the topic will be treated summarily here.
11 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938):
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.
See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), where this rationale was applied to
classifications on the basis of alienage. In Rodriguez itself, the Court stated that the rationale
would be applicable to a group that is so politically powerless that it should receive protection
from the "majoritarian political process." 411 U.S. at 28.
11 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Brown, however, can be viewed as
applicable solely to classifications based upon race.
11 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972):"... legal burdens
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Certainly, this concept fits several classes of handicaps, including
congenital retardation. Mental retardation as a basis for classifica-
tion may be viewed as suspect under any one of the three rationales
of special protection.72 Further, even if the classification is not suspect
when used to deny a relative amount of education, it is certainly
suspect when used to deny all effective education. 73
c. Denial of effective education as having no rational basis.
Even if the right to education is not fundamental, and even if the
classification of handicapped children is not suspect, it may be persu-
asively argued that there is no rational basis for providing education
to most children and yet denying it to the handicapped. 74
...The basic philosophical objectives must surely be the same for
all children: each individual should have the opportunity to become
all that he is capable of being, regardless of his economic level, sex,
color, religion, national origin, geographic location, or handicap-
ping condition. His education should equip him with the tools
needed in life so that he can be of greater value to himself and his
community. .... 5
The irrationality of such denial is further underscored when consid-
ered in light of the facts that handicapped children have greater need
for formal education and that current professional opinion contends
that all handicapped children can benefit from the formal educational
process.
7
Denial of equal access to education has been found to be unrea-
sonable in cases not involving handicapped children. For example, the
California Supreme Court in Manjores v. Newton77 held that neither
the cost of furnishing transportation for plaintiffs to school nor the
possibility that other families might later demand bus service justified
refusal by one school board to provide such transportation where, as
a consequence, children were denied opportunity to attend school.
Similarly, the district court in Hosier v. Evans7 held violative of the
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." Classes within this
concept include race, alienage and national origin, but thus far exclude sex.
72 However, the California supreme court has stated that neither physical nor intellectual
disabilities are suspect, since suspect classifications "frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society." Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329, 340 (1971).
n Dimond and Reed, Rodriguez and Retarded Children 2 J. oF L. & ED. 476, 479 (1973).
7, This is not to say, however, that experimental education programs must necessarily be
made available to all. See Tidewater Soc'y for Autistic Children v. Virginia, Civil No. 426-72-
N (E.D. Va. Dec. 26, 1972).
" Murdock, supra note 18, at 168 (emphasis supplied).
71 See P.A.R.C., 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966).
71 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970).
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equal protection clause a school board regulation permitting enroll-
ment of noncitizens of school age in public schools only if their
enrollment did not cause the number of pupils in any class to exceed
prescribed standards. Thus, a court could find that neither the ex-
pense nor the burden involved in the education of the handicapped
provides reasonable justification for denial of education to those chil-
dren.
Lack of funds is often offered as a defense to the state's failure
to provide education to handicapped children. The defense has been
explicitly rejected by courts in Wyatt,7 9 Mills," and Manjores v.
Newton."' Likewise, the Supreme Court itself has articulated the
limits of such a defense:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the
fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit
its expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or
any other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose
by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not,
for example, reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent
children from its schools."
Furthermore, it has been persuasively argued that the claim of insuf-
ficient funds is just simply untrue:
There are many items in the school budget which support desirable
parts of the program, but parts which may not be critical, [for
example . . . music, . . . art, physical education, etc.]. [It is fine]
that these courses of study are provided in our schools. . . . At the
same time it does not seem . . . that extras for the normal child
[should] have a higher priority than reading, writing, and other
11 344 F. Supp. 387, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
11 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972):
IT]he District of Columbia's interest in educating the excluded children clearly must
outweigh its interest in preserving its financial resources. If sufficient funds are not
available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed and desirable
in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner
that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with
his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies of the District of Colum-
bia Public School System, whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administra-
tive inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the "excep-
tional" or handicapped child than on the normal child.
81 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966). See also Murdock, supra note
18, at 162: "A need for additional funds . . . 'is no reason for the court to refrain from
declaring that the obligation exists.'"
2 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (a welfare benefits case).
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basic education for the handicapped child .... The problem of not
enough money is really a problem of insufficient priority."
In sum, whether a court applies the strict standard, the tradi-
tional rational standard or the means-focused test, argument may be
made that the handicapped have at least a right not to be deprived
of all effective education.
V. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND AN EFFECTIVE EDUCATION
A. Introduction
It may be argued that procedural safeguards provide sufficient
protection to the handicapped child and, therefore, the courts need
not become involved with questions of substantive educational pol-
icy."' But even conscientious procedural safeguards-including those
requiring periodic review-do not necessarily result in a minimally
adequate education. While it may seem that mere placement of a
child in a classroom would assure some minimal education, at least
one adjudication has found that a child may be placed in a school and
yet be totally deprived of an education.
In In re Held,85 Peter Held had been enrolled in the public
schools for five years, three of which had been in special education
classes. During that time, his reading level never exceeded that of an
average first grade student. One year after he was placed in a private
school, his reading level had increased approximately two grades and
Peter became a class leader. The court, noting that Peter had to be
placed in a special educational setting, ordered the state to pay for
Peter's private education and ordered the local school district to pay
the cost of his transportation to that school. Whereas procedural
safeguards may prevent total exclusion from school, they are not
always adequate to prevent total exclusion from education. Only the
recognition of a substantive right to education could have afforded
relief to Peter Held.
E. Martin, supra note 9, at 5-6.
8 See, e.g., Dimond, supra note 49, at 1109-10 (footnotes omitted):
The effective remedy for this problem, therefore, does not rest with courts
affirmatively requiring the schools to provide more special education as a matter of
substantive right under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the minimally accepta-
ble remedy to be imposed by judicial action is fair procedure for assigning children
to various educational programs. Thus, courts need never determine what education
is appropriate for any child; they need only determine the minimally required proce-
dures by which school authorities make such decisions.
See also id. at 118-26.
1 Docket Nos. H-2-71 and H-10-71 (Family Court, Westchester Cy., N.Y., Nov. 29,
1971).
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B. Towards a Substantive Right to an Effective Education
1. Right to an Effective Appeal
Although an independent, constitutional right to education has
not been clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court, an advocate seek-
ing to procure an effective education for his handicapped client may
look to Griffin v. Illinois8 for a constitutional basis for his argu-
ments. In that case, the Court held that an indigent criminal defen-
dant cannot be denied the same opportunity for appeal made avail-
able by the state to others simply because fie cannot afford the price
of a stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings. Like a right to
education, the right to an effective appeal has never been found in the
Constitution. Yet the Court in Griffin held that if a defendant cannot
afford a transcript, (which the Court and parties agreed was neces-
sary to an effective appeal),"7 the state must provide him one.
Similarly, if a state affords education to some of its citizens, then
it must provide an effective education to all of its citizens. Children
effectively denied an education simply because their handicaps are
physical or mental rather than economic are denied their constitu-
tional rights no less than was the criminal defendant in Griffin.
2. The Right to Treatment Cases
An advocate's argument that his client has a right to an educa-
tion that is effective (i.e., a substantive right to education), may find
further support in cases recognizing a civilly committed person's right
to treatment. Rouse v. Cameron"8 recognized a statutory right to
treatment, and Senator Ervin, sponsor of the statute, perceived the
statute as having constitutional footing as well: "[T]o deprive a per-
son of liberty on the basis that he is in need of treatment, without
supplying the needed treatment, is tantamount to a denial of due
process." 9
The District of Columbia's statutory right to treatment has been
summarized as follows:
(1) The hospital need not show that the treatment will cure or
improve him but only that there is a bona fide effort to do so. .;
(2) The effott [must] be to provide treatment which is adequate in
light of present knowledge, [although] the possibility of better treat-
ment does not necessarily prove that the one provided is unsuitable
- 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
" Id. at 16.
- 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11 Murdock, supra note 18, at 150.
HANDICAPPED CHILD'S RIGHT
or inadequate. . . ; (3) adequate number of psychiatric personnel;
(4) initial and periodic inquiries [must be] made into the needs and
conditions of the patient with a view to providing suitable treatment
for him, and that the program provided is suited to his particular
needs. 0
If one were to substitute "school" for "hospital," "education" for
"treatment," and "student" for "patient," etc., in the above sum-
mary, one would have formulated a comprehensive definition of the
right to an effective education. Further, as the right to treatment
cases have thus far indicated, it would be a definition susceptible of
reasonably adequate administration by both the courts and the
schools.
Wyatt v. Stickney1 found a constitutional basis for the right to
treatment
because, absent treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a peni-
tentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted of-
fense." . . . The purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treat-
ment purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care or punish-
ment. This is the only justification, from a constitutional stand-
point, that allows civil commitments to mental institutions . 9
Wyatt articulated the right of institutionalized persons as the
"right to receive such individual treatment as will give each [patient]
a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental
condition.""3 In dealing with this right, the suggested standard of
measurement is the "demonstrable benefit standard."94 Analogy may
be drawn between involuntary institutionalization in Wyatt and a
handicapped child's assignment to a special education class. If a
benefit cannot be demonstrated for the particular student placed in
such a class, then that student has been denied an effective educa-
tion."5
If the institutionalized person has a right to treatment and to
habilitation," then the handicapped child surely has a right to at least
an effective education, when he is "incarcerated" in school for six
hours each day over a period of ten years. Further, if a state must
Id. at 150-51.
*l 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
12 325 F. Supp. at 784.
'3 Id.
, Kirp, supra note 47, at 751.
" For a discussion distinguishing special education programs from tracking, for purposes
of the demonstrable benefit standard, see id. at 752-54.
H For a definition of habilitation, see supra Section III(A).
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provide an appropriate education to institutionalized handicapped
children, it may be argued that there is no rational basis for the denial
of education (and therefore of equal protection), to those handi-
capped children who remain outside institutions. 97
Regardless of the constitutional or statutory considerations, cost
is a major public policy reason to provide effective education to the
retarded. The cost benefit analysis of providing special education has
recently been summarized:
The custodial costs (those exclusive of normal consumption
and developmental expenditures) of lifetime institutionalization of
the retarded are almost $400,000 (1970 dollars). Prevention of insti-
tutionalization may be a significant part of the benefits of extending
additional community services to the retarded ....
A substantial share of the benefits of developmental expendi-
tures on the retarded are received by taxpayers, in the form of
reduced provision of public maintenance and increased tax pay-
ments, probably about one-half of their earnings. 8
C. Judicial Competence and the Right to Education
However education is defined, it is much more than mere cus-
todial care. Although it may at times be difficult to determine if a
particular child is receiving an effective education, such determina-
tion is not beyond the competence of the courts.
In Lau v. Nichols,99 for example, the Supreme Court held that
the failure of the San Francisco school system to provide English
language instruction to non-English-speaking Chinese students con-
stituted a violation of § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.111 While
the Court never reached the constitutional issues involved,1"' it did
0 It may be argued that, if the child is totally excluded from placement in school, and
thus not deprived of his liberty by the state, then there arises no trigger to the state's duty to
provide treatment, habilitation or education. But there are strong policy reasons to insist that
a state providing education to institutionalized persons also provide education to handicapped
persons not institutionalized by the state as well. To do otherwise would be to encourage
institutionalization of handicapped children by their parents and guardians-if only for the
education provided there. Likewise, the term of institutionalization may be extended beyond
the period that other considerations would require. Extended institutionalization, however,
would violate the concept of the "least restrictive alternative," the principle expressed by the
Supreme Court as one in which "even though the governmental purposes be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960). See also Murdock, supra note 18, at 151.
11 R. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 322 (1973).
99 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
414 U.S. at 566.
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reflect upon the impact of such failure upon the educational develop-
ment of those students:
Under these state-imposed standards there is no equality of
treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities,
textbooks, teachers and curriculum; for students who do not under-
stand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful educa-
tion.
Basic English skills are at the very core of what these public
schools teach. Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can
effectively participate in the educational program, he must already
have acquired those basic skills is to make a mockery of public
education. We know that those who do not understand English are
certain to find their classroom experience wholly incomprehensible
and in no way meaningful."'
While not all cases will be as clear or as compelling as Lau,103 courts
have, nevertheless, shown their ability to deal with more difficult
issues of degree and effectiveness in other areas of law.
In contract law, for example, judicial construction of the terms
of the agreement often gives both content and force to those terms.
By way of illustration, when a manufacturer places a product on the
market, he makes-either expressly or impliedly-certain affirma-
tions and warranties about that product.14 When a dispute arises, it
is the court that determines both the actual terms of the agreement
between the manufacturer and the purchaser, just as it may be the
court that determines whether or not-and at what point-those
terms have been breached. 15
"2 Id. (emphasis supplied). The Court's use of the term "mockery" is interesting in that
the word is commonly used in cases dealing with another substantive right-the right to effec-
tive legal representation.
10 For example, Mr. Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion,
restricted the rationale of the case to situations in which "a very substantial group" is deprived
of any meaningful schooling because they cannot understand the language of the classroom:
• . . [W]hen, in another case, we are concerned with a very few youngsters, or with
just a single child who speaks only German or Polish or Spanish or any language
other than English, I would not regard today's decision, or the separate concurrence,
as conclusive. . . . For me, numbers are at the heart of this case and my concurr-
ence is to be understood accordingly.
414 U.S. at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring). There were 1,800 children involved in Lau.
104 See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-312 (implied warranty of merchantability),
2-313 (express warranty).
10 R. NORDSTROM, LAw OF SALES 201 (1970).
Calling an item of goods a "car" implies certain physical attributes about that item:
that it is a certain shape and perhaps even a certain size. . . . If it turns out that
the item has no engine at all, the description as a "car" is false-and the express
warranty has been breached. However, if everything is in working order except the
windshield wipers, the warranty that the item is a "car" has probably not been
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States claim to provide "education" as opposed to "custody."
Thus, in a dispute between the handicapped child and the state, it is
not beyond the competence of a court to define education as the state
itself professes to provide it, and to give that definition force and
effect. A process that does not provide a child any of the component
parts of education is not education at all. It is, rather, a total denial
of education and, if others do receive an education, it is a denial of
equal protection. On the other hand, the "warranty" made by the
state to its citizens through its educational system and statutes is not
breached if the process complies with the minimum components of
education.
A court capable of determining the breach of a complex contract
between private parties is capable of determining when a child has
been denied an effective education by the state as the state has pro-
fessed to provide it.
In arguing that courts are capable of dealing with questions of
degree, reference may be made as well to cases involving the criminal
defendant's right to effective counsel." 6 Although a precise definition
of effective counsel may be difficult to formulate, courts have dealt
with the issue in terms of its bottom line. Thus, a case of ineffective
counsel has been illustrated as a case in which the defense would have
been as well presented had there been no defense attorney at all, or
in which the prosecution or the court would be bound to observe and
to correct the situation."7 Effective counsel is not necessarily errorless
counsel, nor is it to be judged through the use of hindsight. Rather,
effective counsel is counsel reasonably likely to render, and actually
rendering, reasonably effective assistance. 08 These tests may be easily
rephrased to apply to the educational process: the handicapped child
has a right to an education that actually educates him.
breached. At some point between the automobile body without an engine and an
automobile body with all of the accessories except windshield wipers, a no-car has
become a car. This leaves for decision instances in which there were no sparkplugs,
there were sparkplugs but they were inoperative, the tires were worn smooth, or the
steering linkage was defective.
"IB Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). It may be argued that the right to effective
counsel cases, wherein one lawyer (the judge) passes upon another lawyer's performance, is not
truly analogous to the situation where a lawyer (the judge) must pass upon the determinations
of educators. However, it must be remembered that the point of comparison lies in the court's
treatment of questions of degree and of effectiveness. Further, doubts about judicial competence
may be somewhat assuaged if, in light of the fact that education officials act under statutory
grants of power, the situation is perceived as judicial review of legislative determinations.
107 See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN.
L. REV. 1175, 1241 (1970). Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground
for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REV. 289, 304 (1964).
I" West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737,
447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
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Perhaps the most common ground for a finding of ineffective
counsel has been inadequate time for the investigation of the case and
for the preparation of its defense.109 This inadequancy and others like
it (e.g., the denial of the right of private consultation with counsel),
are procedural and have their equivalent in the realm of education in
assuring that a child's due process rights are given him. Just as work-
sheet time records can protect an attorney from the charge that he
spent insufficient time on a particular criminal case,110 a school's
record of the procedure used to assign a child to a particular class
may protect the school from a charge that the child's individual needs
were not considered.
Substantive errors, too, may be the basis of complaint, and edu-
cators may expect charges that they have made serious mistakes in
matters within their discretion. In an effective counsel case, a finding
of ineffectiveness may be based upon a fundamental misunderstan-
ding of the law,' or upon the loss of a crucial defense due to the
ignorance or omission of counsel."' The test of substantive ineffec-
tiveness has been articulated as requiring findings that there was no
reasonable basis for counsel's action and that the error probably
affected the outcome (the harmless error doctrine)."' In this regard,
however, right to education cases should be distinguished. Whereas
the issue involved in right to counsel cases is one of guilt or innocence
of the criminal defendant, the relevant issue in the right to education
cases is the ultimate question of the education of the child. Thus,
when a child seeks an effective education or a change of placement
within the educational system, the issue of reasonableness of past
conduct by educators should not be relevant."1 Rather, the relevant
inquiries should be whether the child is receiving an effective educa-
tion and, if not, what actions can be taken to provide the child with
an effective education.
VI. THE PROCEDURE OF A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT
As with a claim of ineffective counsel,1 a presumption of valid-
'" Grano, supra note 107, at 1240; Waltz, supra note 107, at 303.
"' Id. at 1248.
"' People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
112 In re Greenfield, II Cal. App. 2d 536, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1970).
113 Grano, supra note 107, at 1250.
"I The issue of reasonableness should be relevant, however, as a defense to a suit ,for
monetary damages.
its Attorneys licensed by the state are presumed to be competent unless shown to be
otherwise. The defendant's proof must detail the factual content of his complaint and, where
matters outside the formal record are relied upon, they must be shown with particularity.
Waltz, supra note 107, at 235.
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ity will very likely be accorded placement decisions of educators and
curriculum decisions of teachers. Partly because the substantive issue
is difficult, the party raising the issue of denial of education may
therefore find himself assigned the burden of its proof. This burden
should, however, be balanced against the handicapped child's possible
lack of financial resources, specialized knowledge and information.
Thus, his burden should be an initial burden only. The plaintiff should
be able to meet this burden if he can show procedural irregularity.
This allocation of the burden of proof should permit the plaintiff to
establish his case as early as the discovery stage. If the child meets
his initial burden, the burden of going forward would then be upon
the school, and proof that it is capable of providing an adequate
education to handicapped children in general would have to be pre-
sented. If the school can establish this-perhaps simply by asking the
court to take judicial notice of professional standards-then the bur-
den of proof would again return to the child, who would be required
to prove that he, as an individual, has not received an adequate
education."' Thus, if the child has not been denied procedural due
process, he must prove that he has been denied a substantive educa-
tion, overcoming the presumption that due care has been exercised
by the school." 7
In making its judgment on the procedural due process issue, the
court should "insure that the decision makers have (1) reached a
reasoned and not unreasonable decision, (2) by employing proper
criteria, and (3) without overlooking anything of substantial relev-
ance.""'
In education as in mental health and other areas, there is the
danger that judicially imposed standards will stifle experimentation.
This possibility should not shield public schools from accountability
for meeting minimum standards. The Wyatt court emphasized that
"these standards are, indeed, minimums only peripherally ap-
proaching the ideal to which defendants should aspire." More im-
portant, experimentation in other areas is suspect when not founded
upon or designed to achieve at least the most basic education possi-
ble for each class of children."'
"I6 R. JOHNSON, LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL COMPETENCE IN SETTING
STANDARDS FOR INSTITUTIONS FOR MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS, 61-62 (1973) (unpub-
lished).
"t Id. at 60-62.
"t Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1969). This case concerned a habeas
corpus petition by a mental patient seeking transfer from a maximum security ward to one that
was less restricted.
I McClung, Do Handicapped Children Have a Right to a Minimally Adequate
Education? CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS 318 (Rev. ed. 1973).
HANDICAPPED CHILD'S RIGHT
VII. CONCLUSION
As P.A.R.C. and Mills evidence, great progress has been made
in providing appropriate educational service to handicapped children.
While Rodriguez may slow the trend, it will not halt it. If the right
to treatment cases are upheld by the Supreme Court,2 0 the cost in-
crease resulting from the required improvement in the quality of
habilitation in state institutions will create pressure to provide serv-
ices-especially to the retarded and to the emotionally dis-
turbed-outside the traditional warehousing institution. Further-
more, awareness of the long-range financial benefits that can flow
from special education programs will increase. New state laws guar-
anteeing education to the handicapped are passed with increasing
frequency,"' and several bills have been introduced in Congress to aid
the education of the handicapped.' The Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare now requires that schools test students in the
language in which the students are most fluent.'m
The advocate must remember, however, that not all statutes,
regulations and court decisions are complied with, and that there are
yet many handicapped children-one million of them-who are ex-
cluded entirely from the educational process. Just how much
Rodriguez will slow the trend of expansion of the right to education
is yet to be seen.
12 The Supreme Court has docketed for review a right to treatment case. Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 894 (1974).
"I See MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 13, at 48-49.
2 Abeson, Movement and Momentum: Government and the Education of Handicapped
Children, EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 563, 565 (1972). H.B. 654 and S.B. 6 were introduced during
the first two weeks of the 94th Congress.
11 United States Dept. of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Fact Sheet-Language Discrimina-
tion (1972).
